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THE INFLUENCERS: FACEBOOK’S LIBRA, PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS,
AND THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF CENTRALIZATION
Professor Michele Benedetto Neitz *
The theoretical promise of blockchain technology is truly
extraordinary: a peer-to-peer distributed immutable ledger that
could revolutionize economies, societies, and even our daily lives.
But what if blockchain technology is not as decentralized as people
think? What are the ramifications if, in reality, a blockchain’s core
decisions are actually influenced by small groups of people or
corporations?
This short article seeks to answer that question, by
demonstrating that decentralized public blockchains are only as
immutable as the decentralization of their governance. Moreover,
the announcement of Libra, Facebook’s new permissioned
blockchain, shows a growing trend of centralized control around
decentralized technologies. Libra is intended to run on highly
distributed technology, but will be governed by, and therefore
could be arguably controlled by, a highly centralized group of
billion-dollar corporations.
Accordingly, this article exposes the ways in which blockchain
centralization is leaving important decisions to small groups of
people or corporations. These blockchain “agents of influence”
have more power than many blockchain proponents acknowledge.
Whenever human decision-making processes are in effect, the
possibility of bias, conflicts of interest, and other ethical concerns
will arise. Ironically, it is exactly this type of flawed human
process that the blockchain was designed to solve.
*
Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California, and Member of the California Blockchain Working Group. J.D. New
York University School of Law, 2001; B.A., Santa Clara University, 1997. The
views expressed are my own. I am grateful to Professor Spencer Williams,
Professor Sam Ernst, Gloria Mengyi Wang, James Pitts, Carla Carriveau, and
other blockchain engineers who provided technical advice and editing
suggestions.
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This article therefore argues that as states design laws to
regulate blockchain technology, they should consider adding
ethical obligations to combat the problems inherent whenever
small groups of people make influential decisions. By adopting
ethical guidelines at this early stage, while the technology is still
evolving, states and blockchain enthusiasts may abate public fears
of blockchain technology and prevent larger ethical crises from
developing down the road.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
New technologies often provoke fear. As the Industrial
Revolution gained traction in 1854, Henry David Thoreau warned,
“[w]e do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us.” 1 Thoreau was
concerned that the new technologies reinventing the American
economy would have unforeseen social costs, such as the effect of
conditions on laborers and environmental concerns. 2
We are living in a similar age of technological revolution,
arguably the largest since the Internet was created several decades
ago. Broad adoption of the Internet in the mid-1990s changed
everything from the world’s economy to social norms, forever
impacting the way people work, consume goods, and manage
social relationships. With the advent of blockchain technology,
many observers believe that a “new Internet” is upon us. 3
Accordingly, the historical precedent rings true once again as we
witness new worries about the effects of blockchain. As Forbes
magazine recently asked, “[j]ust why is there so much fear around
the area of cryptocurrency [and blockchain] . . . ?” 4
The theoretical promise of blockchain technology is truly
extraordinary: a distributed immutable ledger with “unhackable
algorithms” that “makes trust unnecessary.” 5 Blockchain
proponents argue that this structure has the potential to
revolutionize even more than the Internet did by eliminating the
need for institutional trust. 6 Moreover, some proponents suggest
1
Randy Alfred, Aug 9, 1854: Thoreau warns “The Railroad Rides on Us,”
WIRED (Aug. 9, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/08/0809thoreau-waldenpublished/ [https://perma.cc/K7P4-5EM6].
2
Id.
3
Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why Blockchain Needs the Law, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 487, 528–29 (2018).
4
Lauren deLisa Coleman, Why the Massive Fears Around Cryptocurrency
Will Rise and What’s Next for 2018, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurencoleman/2017/12/17/why-the-massivefears-around-cryptocurrency-will-rise-and-whats-next-for-2018/#394b9ddb742d
[https://perma.cc/E6AW-3WPU].
5
STEPHEN P. WILLIAMS, BLOCKCHAIN: THE NEXT EVERYTHING 15 (2019).
6
See Esther Shein, How Blockchain Changes the Nature of Trust, LINUX
FOUND. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.linuxfoundation.org/blog/2019/01/
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that traditional establishments, including banks and governments,
will no longer be relevant in the age of blockchain. 7 In response to
the rapid advancement of blockchain technology, state and federal
governments are scrambling to adapt laws and regulations for a
newly decentralized economy. 8
But what if blockchain technology is not as decentralized as
people think? What if, in reality, a blockchain’s core decisions are
actually influenced by small groups of people or corporations?
Private blockchains, also known as permissioned blockchains,
limit participation to specific individuals selected by a particular
enterprise. These blockchains are already centralized, since “the
owner of the blockchain is a single entity or an enterprise which
can override/delete commands on a blockchain if needed.” 9 But
even public blockchains are showing a growing tendency toward
centralized decision-making power. This can be dangerous because
the transactions in a ledger are only as immutable as the ledger
itself. Although a blockchain mathematically ensures that records
how-blockchain-changes-the-nature-of-trust/
[https://perma.cc/8NN7-XC7T]
(“Blockchain shifts trust in people and institutions to trust in technology.”).
7
See, e.g., Aleksei Gudkov, Control on Blockchain Network, 42 NOVA L.
REV. 353, 374 (2018) (“The anonymity of decentralized network participants
and peculiarities of technology prevent governments from efficient control over
the network.”); but see Marcella Atzori, Blockchain Technology and
Decentralized Governance: Is the State Still Necessary?, 6 J. OF GOVERNANCE
& REG. 45, 45–62 (2017) (explaining the arguments in favor of decentralized
governance but arguing that the role of the State is still a necessary one).
8
See, e.g., Andrew Bloom, Are Maryland and Virginia’s Cryptocurrency
Laws a Bellwether for Federal Rules and Regulations?, GOV’T BLOCKCHAIN
ASS’N (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.gbaglobal.org/are-maryland-and-virginiascryptocurrency-laws-a-bellwether-for-federal-rules-and-regulations/
[https://perma.cc/A4AS-C9VH]; see also Andrew Bloom, Blockchain 2019:
U.S. Legislators Introduce New Bills Defining “Blockchain Technology”,
GOV’T BLOCKCHAIN ASS’N (May 1, 2019), https://www.gbaglobal.org/unitedstates-senate-and-house-of-representatives-2019-blockchain-technology-bills/
[https://perma.cc/GH69-ZGPA].
9
Harsh Agrawal, What Are Private Blockchains & How Are They Different
From Public Blockchains? COINSUTRA (Sept. 15, 2018), https://coinsutra.com/
private-blockchain-public-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/Q5Y8-RYNK] (“That’s
why in its true sense [a permissioned blockchain] is not decentralized and hence
can just be called a distributed ledger or database with cryptography to secure
it.”).
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in a ledger are immutable, there is no similar algorithmic assurance
surrounding the various parties who design, develop, and deploy
the ledger itself. Who governs those decisions depends on each
individual blockchain, but the control of such decisions can often
be far from decentralized.
Indeed, there are numerous examples in which small groups of
people influence the determinations that ultimately affect
blockchains and their users. As discussed below, the Ethereum
“hard fork” decision in 2016 is a clear example that decentralized
blockchains are only as immutable as the decentralization of their
governance. 10 The recent announcement of Libra, Facebook’s new
permissioned blockchain, shows a growing trend toward
centralized control around decentralized technologies. Libra is
intended to run on highly distributed technology, but will be
governed by, and therefore could arguably be controlled by, a
highly centralized group of billion-dollar corporations. 11
Part II of this article describes how “decentralized” blockchain
technology is actually moving toward centralization, with some
individuals possessing the capacity to make critical decisions.
These blockchain “agents of influence” have more power than
many blockchain proponents acknowledge. This power creates a
centralized effect on the development of blockchain technology,
and also raises questions about the potential motivation driving
these agents of influence.
Part III explains how this is problematic, because human
decision-making processes inevitably invite the possibility of bias,
conflicts of interest, and other ethical concerns. Ironically, it is
exactly this type of flawed human process that blockchain was
designed to avoid.
Part IV therefore argues that as states design laws to regulate
blockchain technology, it is imperative that they consider adding
ethical obligations to combat the problems inherent in human
decision-making processes. The ethical rules governing the
See infra section II.C.1.
See LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBRA 3–4 (2019),
https://libra.org/en-US/white-paper/
[https://perma.cc/YW7J-N5WN]
[hereinafter LIBRA WHITE PAPER].
10
11
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conduct of lawyers, another field with outsized power to affect
socioeconomic change, can serve as an effective starting point. The
rules prohibiting bias and conflicts of interest are particularly
applicable in the blockchain space.
Part V addresses potential challenges to the implementation of
an ethical code of conduct, and recommends further research in
these areas. By adopting ethical guidelines at this early stage, while
the technology is still evolving, states and blockchain enthusiasts
may abate public fears of blockchain technology and prevent larger
ethical crises from developing down the road.
II.

THE REALITY OF BLOCKCHAIN CENTRALIZATION: WHO
IS IN CONTROL?

A. Defining Blockchain Technology
The definition of blockchain technology is admittedly a bit dry
for non-technical readers. Academic authors define blockchain as a
decentralized “database that uses certain cryptographic functions to
achieve the requirements of data integrity and identity
authentication.” 12 Although the technical definition is complicated,
the essential function of blockchain is much simpler: providing a
record, or ledger, of transactions that is both distributed and
immutable. These transactions could be anything from
cryptocurrency sales and purchases to health care records.
The ledger is distributed because it is not governed by a central
entity, but is instead run on open-source software by a network of
computers distributed around the world. 13 The reader of this article
could download this software on his/her computer, and begin
contributing to writing transactions into the ledger thereby

12
Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal
Introduction to Distributed and Centralised Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1,
5–6 (2018).
13
Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries
in Public Blockchains, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CHALLENGES 61 (Ioannis Lianos, et al., eds., 2019).
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becoming a “miner.” Miners are investors who permanently write
transactions into a blockchain. 14
The distributed nature of a blockchain ledger means that there
is no central point of failure; records on blockchains may be kept
on thousands of individual computers scattered worldwide. 15 This
leads to a “trustless” system, in which a person can trust the
validity of transactions without needing to rely on the integrity of
intermediaries such as banks or governments. 16 In addition, one
single distributed ledger can be used in the place of multiple
private ledgers requiring reconciliation, thereby reducing the costs
of transactions. 17
The ledger is also immutable (i.e., unable to be changed). Once
the transaction is written into the blockchain, it is mathematically
impossible to remove that record. Immutability is the real power of
the blockchain—the ability to ensure the ledgers based on it can
never be changed or manipulated, without the need for third party
verification.
On its face, the definition and function of blockchain
technology may appear uncontroversial. But observers describe
this technology in wildly divergent terms. Is blockchain a “worldchanging technology” that will “transform society” and enable a
“bright future for the planet”? 18 Or is it a “haven for criminal
activity, a Ponzi scheme, and a road both to anarchy and to
authoritarianism?” 19 Or is it all of these?

Ameer Rosic, Ethereum Mining 101: Your Complete Guide, HUFFPOST
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ethereum-mining-101-yourcomplete-guide_b_58b6e1eee4b02f3f81e44e9f [https://perma.cc/U9B9-QE44].
Miners participate in “peer distributed cryptocurrency network[s] in consensus,”
and are “subsequently rewarded for providing solutions to challenging math
problems.” Id. This is accomplished by “putting [the] computer’s hardware to
use with mining applications.” Id.
15
PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 35
(2018).
16
Werbach, supra note 3, at 491.
17
Id.
18
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 182.
19
Werbach, supra note 3, at 489.
14
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The truth is that blockchains are tools which can be used for
both “good and malicious ends.” 20 The original innovators of
blockchain viewed the technology as a path to a libertarian ideal.
Cryptocurrencies running on blockchains were designed to offer “a
solution to the problem of government oversight of value-based
transactions.” 21 From this standpoint, decentralized ledger
technology can serve as a “firewall” against government regulation
and intervention. 22 Thus, libertarians view blockchain technology
as a chance to engage in economic activities outside the bounds of
state control. 23 Some admirers see this technology as providing a
chance to “undermine entrenched private power.” 24
On paper, this may all be true. Blockchain use case possibilities
go well beyond cryptocurrencies; blockchain technology is
impacting everything from health care to supply chain
management to electronic voting. 25 But as states begin to adopt
regulations governing cryptocurrencies and other uses of
blockchain technology, 26 it is becoming clear that the libertarian
ideal of a blockchain free from government oversight was just that:
an ideal. Moreover, there are already examples in which human
decision-making has counteracted the immutability of some public
blockchains.
B. Increasing Centralization
For public blockchains such as Ethereum, decentralization
remains the vision. The founder of Ethereum described public
blockchains as politically and architecturally decentralized, but
logically centralized because the nodes in the system reach “one
Michele Finck, Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown, 19 GERMAN L. J.
665, 666 (2018).
21
Werbach, supra note 3, at 522.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 497.
24
Id.
25
For a summary of emerging blockchain use cases, see Pavel Romanenko,
20 Blockchain Use Cases for 2018 You Should Know, HACKERNOON (Dec. 11,
2018), https://hackernoon.com/20-blockchain-use-cases-for-2018-you-shouldknow-f7d2919c191d [https://perma.cc/6THL-DAFQ].
26
See Bloom, supra note 8.
20
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commonly agreed [upon] state” through consensus. 27 The result is
that the system “behaves like a single computer.” 28 Theoretically,
therefore, the only centralization in Ethereum is the platform itself,
operating seamlessly through consensus.
In practice, however, some public blockchains do not operate
in the decentralized way their advocates originally envisioned. As
the technology develops, there have been numerous inflection
points requiring decisions influenced by real people, not by nodes
operating through consensus. 29 These so-called “agents of
influence” raise an intriguing issue: who really controls consensus
in blockchain technology?
Blockchain technologists would likely state that the answer is
clear: the whole point of consensus is the avoidance of a
centralized power structure. However, a close examination of the
way public blockchains, such as Ethereum, have operated in recent
years demonstrates that blockchain platforms have “agents of
influence” who informally affect the ways consensus is reached.
C. Case Study 1: Ethereum (Public Blockchain)
1. The 2016 DAO Hack
Ethereum is a peer-to-peer network developed via an opensource process, 30 and the founder of Ethereum maintains that “[t]he
Ethereum Foundation tries very hard to be a decentralized
organization.” 31 The responsibility for changes to the code protocol
belongs to a “small unit” known as the Core Developers (or the

Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of Centralization, MEDIUM (Feb. 26, 2017),
https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralizationa0c92b76a274 [https://perma.cc/QLE5-4NJQ].
28
Id.
29
See Walch, supra note 13, at 62 (discussing “the power that a small group
of developers wield” in public blockchains).
30
Bacon, supra note 12, at 62–63.
31
Romain Dillet, Vitalik Buterin: “I definitely hope centralized exchanges go
burn in hell as much as possible,” TECH CRUNCH (July 6, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/06/vitalik-buterin-i-definitely-hope-centralizedexchanges-go-burn-in-hell-as-much-as-possible/
[https://perma.cc/QQE69DES].
27
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“Core Devs”). 32 The core developers meet regularly in open
meetings online. 33
The influence of the core developers is illustrated by the
response to the well-known Decentralized Autonomous
Organization (“DAO”) hack on the Ethereum platform. 34 The DAO
was created in 2016 to enable funding of Ethereum-based
projects. 35 It was very successful, with approximately 11,000
members contributing $160 million in Ether funding. 36 In one of
the most notorious blockchain hacks to date, an unknown hacker
found a “vulnerability in [t]he DAO’s smart contracts and
siphoned off almost a third of its funds.” 37
In response to the hack, Ethereum’s core developers proposed a
hard fork, effectively “reversing the transaction[s].” 38 These seven
core developers “unilaterally” made the decision to “essentially
create a new version of the network with different rules than the
original. Then, miners, exchanges, and other major apps that were

32
Johnson Go, Core developer believes Ethereum governance has failed,
CRYPTOPOLITAN (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.cryptopolitan.com/core-developerbelieves-ethereum-governance-has-failed/ [https://perma.cc/X95W-CBNR]. One
core developer recently made headlines by advocating that Ethereum should
embrace a centralized management structure. Id.
33
See, ETHEREUM FOUND., Ethereum Core Devs Meeting #64 [2019-07-05],
(July
4,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2D_
YOUTUBE
DqJ8jL9Y&feature=youtu.be&t=226 [https://perma.cc/T4XN-R2C8].
34
See, e.g., Matthew Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/
[https://perma.cc/U7GG-CC68]; see also Joon Ian Wong & Ian Kar, Everything
you need to know about the Ethereum “hard fork,” QUARTZ (July 18, 2016),
https://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-ethereum-hardfork/ [https://perma.cc/XWU4-Q9BP].
35
Bacon, supra note 12, at 204. These projects included the use of “smart
locks to let people share their physical assets (e.g. cars, boats, apartments).” Id.
(emphasis original).
36
Id.
37
Id. For a detailed summary of the DAO Hack, see Leising, supra note 34.
38
Aziz, Guide to Ethereum Hard Forks: Ethereum Classic, Etherzero &
Metropolis, MASTER THE CRYPTO, https://masterthecrypto.com/ethereum-hardforks-guide-ethereum-classic-etherzero-metropolis/
[https://perma.cc/8NADHPHB].
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built on it need[ed] to decide if they want[ed] to [be] a part of the
new version of Ethereum or the original.” 39
The new version of Ethereum was ultimately adopted by a
majority of the miners. 40 This was an extraordinary remedy for an
unforeseen (and dramatic) hack, as it required “chang[ing]
Ethereum’s underlying codes.” 41 Although some argued that this
response was a violation of blockchain users’ “most fundamental
values,” 42 the core developers had enough sway to convince most
miners that the hard fork was the proper response to the hack. 43
This is one example of a small group of people advocating
successfully for the modification of a so-called immutable
blockchain.
2. Parity’s Smart Contract Bug on Ethereum (2017)
Nearly two years later, a developer company named Parity was
attempting to fix a bug after a hack on the Ethereum platform. 44
Parity inadvertently left a second bug in its smart contracts,
enabling one user to accidentally take control of hundreds of
wallets 45 containing millions of dollars’ worth of Ether. 46 The user
Wong & Kar, supra note 34.
Aziz, supra note 38 (“[T]he majority of participants on the Ethereum
blockchain—led by Ethereum’s core developers—felt that the right thing to do
was to reverse the transactions.”).
41
Id.
42
Leising, supra note 34; see also Adam Sulkowski, Blockchain, Business
Supply Chains, Sustainability, and Law: The Future of Governance, Legal
Frameworks, and Lawyers? 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 303, 320 (2018).
43
See Walch, supra note 13, at 63 (“only a small number of developers and
miners in this ‘decentralized’ system decided what the resolution of the DAO
hack would be . . . .”).
44
See Alex Hern, ‘$300m in cryptocurrency’ accidentally lost forever due to
bug, GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/nov/08/cryptocurrency-300m-dollars-stolen-bug-ether
[https://perma.cc/7M2W-PY95].
45
A digital wallet is a “software program that stores private and public keys”
which enables blockchain users “to send and receive digital currency and
monitor their balance.” Ameer Rosic, Cryptocurrency Wallet Guide: A Step-ByStep Tutorial, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/cryptocurrencywallet-guide/ [https://perma.cc/EF9B-LM4Z] (last visited July 17, 2019).
46
Hern, supra note 44; see also Michael Yuan, “I accidentally killed it” (and
evaporated $300 million), MEDIUM (Nov. 10, 2017), https://medium.com/
39
40
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tried to return the money by deleting the code that had transferred
ownership, which had the unintended effect of permanently
locking up $300 million worth of ether. 47 Given this accidental
“freezing” of ether coin, the only way for Ethereum to restore the
funds was to again do a hard fork. 48 The owners of the frozen
currency justifiably pushed for such a response. 49 However,
Ethereum’s core developers decided not to do a hard fork in this
case, instead electing to leave the $300 million locked.
Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum’s founder, defended the decision on
Twitter. 50 When asked by a Twitter user “[d]o you think you can
explain why the DAO hack was granted [a hard fork] and this hack
would not be?” Buterin gave three reasons for the decision: “1.
[The] [e]cosystem [was] less mature then[;] 2. [There was] [m]ore
at stake then as [a percentage] of all ETH[;] [and] 3. [t]oday’s
attacker can just move funds, so HF is impossible.” 51
The hard fork in the DAO Hack case, and the lack of a hard
fork in the Parity bug case, are instructive examples of the power
of a small group of people to influence decisions on a blockchain
platform. In the first situation, millions of dollars were returned to
the proper individuals; in the other, millions of dollars are still
locked away. Those critical decisions were made not by math, but
by fallible human choice.
cybermiles/i-accidentally-killed-it-and-evaporated-300-million-6b975dc1f76b
[https://perma.cc/2S2Y-WLPX].
47
Hern, supra note 44.
48
The Ethereum Foundation’s head of security stated, “I see it as an objective
fact that these funds cannot be unlocked unless there is a hardfork involved.”
Jon Neilson, No Solution Found for Parity Wallet Bug That Froze 500,000 ETH
Worth $150M, COINCODEX, https://coincodex.com/article/1054/no-solutionfound-for-parity-wallet-bug-that-froze-500000-eth-worth-150m/
[https://perma.cc/UKB2-XYGW]; see also Hern, supra note 44.
49
Jen Wieczner, Ethereum Fork Could Help Restore Frozen Parity
Cryptocurrency, FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/03/04/
ethereum-fork-parity-frozen-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/VD3W-9AVX]
(“Parity developers . . . argued without success for a hard fork in the Ethereum
blockchain in order to restore the frozen cryptocurrency.”).
50
Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin), TWITTER (July 19, 2017),
https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/887783867129745412
[https://perma.cc/LQG5-9GDP].
51
Id.
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Is a platform that gives this level of influence to a small group
of people really a “decentralized” platform? In fact, observers have
noted that cryptocurrencies “resemble traditional governance
structures,” since “much of the decision-making process is not
explicit and efficient and users aren’t completely empowered.” 52
This raises profound ethical concerns. In Ethereum’s case,
most members of the Ethereum Foundation (and presumably the
Core Developers) are seeking to “do what is best for Ethereum.” 53
If management of public blockchain platforms is so strongly
influenced by a small number of core persons, those persons—as
well meaning as they may be—will bring their biases and conflicts
of interest to the blockchain. But here is where theory and reality
diverge, for “[w]hen the beautiful math . . . meets the messy reality
of real-world implementation, it turns out to be not so perfect.” 54
D. Case Study 2: Facebook’s Libra (Permissioned Blockchain)
In June 2019, Facebook announced its intention to create its
own cryptocurrency, called Libra, on a permissioned blockchain.
Libra operates as a textbook example of the problematic ethical
issues at stake.
Facebook’s Libra White Paper describes the company’s
intention to “design and govern” the currency’s ecosystem for
“public good,” with special regard for advancing “financial
inclusion” and supporting “ethical actors.” 55 Libra will be built on
52
Nick Tomaino, The Governance of Blockchains, MEDIUM (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://thecontrol.co/the-governance-of-blockchains-5ba17a4f5da6
[https://perma.cc/GL8E-Z2G8]. There are some governance experiments
happening in the blockchain space. For example, Polkadot will be delegating
“management power directly to token holders.” Rachel Rose O’Leary,
Polkadot’s Plan for Governing a Blockchain of Blockchains, COINDESK (Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.coindesk.com/polkadots-radical-plan-governingblockchain-blockchains [https://perma.cc/X4BJ-R5LZ]. The founder of
Polkadot stated that he is developing this model because “we’re still woefully
inadequate at solving consensus for what happens to the chain.” Id.
53
The Ethereum Foundation Team, Ethereum Foundation Spring 2019
Update, ETHEREUM BLOG (May 21, 2019), https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/
05/21/ethereum-foundation-spring-2019-update/ [https://perma.cc/T3E8-GZ2K].
54
Werbach, supra note 3, at 512.
55
LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 1–3.
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a “secure, stable, and reliable blockchain,” and will be backed by
“a reserve of real assets.” 56 Although all consumers will be able to
use Libra coin, participation in the governance and control of the
infrastructure is only reserved for those selected by Facebook to be
part of the Libra Association. 57
Libra will be governed by this “independent” Libra
Association, a collection of large corporations and nonprofits
“tasked with evolving the ecosystem.” 58 The Libra Association is
the only party able to mint and burn the Libra coin. 59 It will be
governed by a “Council,” which will consist of a representative of
each member of the Association. The Council will vote on
decisions and will in turn be managed by the Libra Association
Board. 60
This raises an obvious question: who will be part of the Libra
Association, and therefore be able to join the Council and/or the
Board to make decisions for the blockchain? Unlike the culture at
Ethereum, which is open to any code developer, 61 membership in
the Libra Association requires an elite set of credentials. For
example, for a business to become a Founding Member, it must be
able to meet two of the following three thresholds:
1. Have more than $1 billion USD in market value or greater than
$500 million USD customer balances.
2. Reach greater than 20 million people a year, multinationally.
Id. These assets include “basket of bank deposits and short-term
government securities.” Id.
57
Some have argued that permissioned blockchains are innately centralized,
since “the owner of the blockchain is a single entity or an enterprise which can
override/delete commands on a blockchain if needed.” Agrawal, supra note 9
(“That’s why in its true sense [a permissioned blockchain] is not decentralized
and hence can just be called a distributed ledger or database with cryptography
to secure it.”).
58
LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 3.
59
LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 8–11.
60
Id.
61
In 2017, the founder of Ethereum tweeted “How you can help Ethereum:
send smart people our way. Math, CS, dist sys, crypto, econ, game theory, behav
econ all highly welcome.” Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin), TWITTER (May
24, 2017, 5:22 AM), https://twitter.com/vitalikbuterin/status/86735511
8005436416 [https://perma.cc/4X4D-DL9J].
56
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3. Be recognized as a top-100 industry leader by a third-party sectorspecific association or media company. 62

Crypto-focused investors seeking to become Founding
Members must have more than $1 billion of assets under
management. 63 Nonprofits have similarly exclusive membership
requirements, as they must be ranked in the top 100 list of
nonprofits, as determined by one of several ranking measures, and
must have at least a $50 million budget.64
Libra will be a permissioned blockchain, so it is understandable
that there would be some level of validation required to secure
permission to join. Libra developers explained that “Founding
Members are organizations with established reputations, making it
unlikely that they would act maliciously . . . .” 65 While it may be
true that these “established” Founding Members have compliance
barriers in place, the plethora of recent corporate scandals
demonstrates that established reputations do not guarantee
benevolent behavior. 66
Facebook is trying to make Libra public and fully distributed
within five years, but there is no guarantee that will occur. 67 In fact,
LIBRA ASS’N MEMBER, HOW TO BECOME A FOUNDING MEMBER 3 (2019),
https://libra.org/en-US/becoming-founding-member/#member_evaluation_
criteria [https://perma.cc/62BQ-CLR4]. Initial members include MasterCard,
eBay, Coinbase, and Andreessen Horowitz. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Zachary Amsden et al., THE LIBRA BLOCKCHAIN 24 (2019),
https://developers.libra.org/docs/assets/papers/the-libra-blockchain.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UL9D-QMXK].
66
See, e.g., Sachin Waikar, Businesses Behaving Badly: The State of
Corporate Scandal in 2019, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/businesses-behaving-badly-statecorporate-scandal-2019 [https://perma.cc/PSX4-JBYA] (“the potential for U.S.
corporate misbehavior remains high”); Matt Egan, The Two-Year Wells Fargo
Horror Story Just Won’t End, CNN (Sept. 7, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/
2018/09/07/news/companies/wells-fargo-scandal-two-years/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7A7S-PKKT].
67
LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 10–11. (“Together with the
community, the association will research the technological challenges on the
path to a permissionless ecosystem so that we can meet the objective to begin
the transition within five years of the launch.”).
62
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Facebook is hoping it will be able to create technology that allows
a truly decentralized blockchain to handle a large number of
transactions. That is not yet possible with current technology, and
no one has yet agreed upon a solution.68 In truth, it is difficult to
reconcile the power of the Libra Association’s elite Founding
Members with the concept of a “decentralized” blockchain,
regardless of whether Facebook reaches its ultimate goal of
making Libra a public blockchain.
Indeed, there are unintended consequences lurking throughout
Facebook’s vision of Libra. While Facebook has taken steps to
minimize its involvement and guarantees the existence of a
“firewall” between the social media’s data collection and this new
financial tool, it is not hard to imagine a breach in the firewall that
would enable Facebook to connect spending power with true
identities. 69 This raises significant conflict of interest concerns.
In addition, who can say what biases the corporate members of
the Libra Association will bring to their decision-making? Ethical
questions abound, with no guidance available to steer Facebook (or
any other blockchain developer) on how to choose the most ethical
path.

LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 4 (“The challenge is that as of today
we do not believe that there is a proven solution that can deliver the scale,
stability, and security needed to support billions of people and transactions
across the globe through a permissionless network.”).
69
Observers began to express concerns about the strength of the firewall
within days of the Libra announcement. See, e.g., Letter to Legislators,
Regulators, and Facebook and Calibra employees, PUBLIC CITIZEN (July 2,
2019), https://www.citizen.org/article/reject-libra/ [https://perma.cc/5E5ACJWT] (asking a serious of questions about the firewall, including “What
guarantees will there be that Facebook does not use Calibra to obtain access to
the transactions across the Libra network? What protections does incorporation
of a subsidiary offer? What is to prevent Facebook from unilaterally altering
promises about a firewall between Calibra and Facebook?”); see also Scott A.
Shay, Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency: Bad for Privacy, Competition, ASIA
TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/06/article/facebookslibra-cryptocurrency-bad-for-privacy-competition/
[https://perma.cc/PTL6WWJ7] (“Facebook will speak piously about privacy controls and its concern
for the consumer, yet it will still figure out a way to sell the data or others who
buy the data will figure it out for them.”).
68
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Libra may change as the currency develops. Steve Forbes
wrote an open letter advising Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to
make the Libra coin more stable. 70 Representative Maxine Waters
called on Facebook to hold off on development plans for Libra
until Congress has a chance to ask questions. 71 France declared that
it would block the development of Libra in Europe completely
until Facebook addressed consumer risk and government
sovereignty concerns. 72 As with any new technology, public fear
about Libra is percolating. However, stifling innovation
completely cannot be a permanent solution. To address regulators’
concerns about evolving blockchain technology, Congress and
state legislators should instead consider implementing ethical rules
to guide the evolution of this new currency.
THE NEED FOR ETHICAL RULES IN BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY
Ethical issues can occur whenever humans are involved in
decision-making. This is especially true in professions with the
power to influence people and policy, such as the legal profession.
Lawyers and judges are regularly called upon to make decisions
that impact people. Accordingly, states began drafting ethical
codes over 100 years ago to govern their conduct. 73
III.

Steve Forbes, Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, FORBES (June 25, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2019/06/25/open-letter-to-markzuckerberg/#2ef448622614 [https://perma.cc/P6MF-STRT].
71
Zachary Warmbrodt, Waters Calls on Facebook to Halt Digital Currency
Plans, POLITICO (June 18, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/
18/maxine-waters-facebook-hearing-1539475 [https://perma.cc/WV77-9LJW].
72
Richard Partington, France to Block Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency in
Europe, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/sep/12/france-block-development-facebook-libracryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/4FKC-ZU5S].
73
The first ethical Code of Conduct for lawyers was drafted in Alabama in
1887. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2004). The ABA adopted the first
“Canons of Judicial Ethics” in 1924. Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The
Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST.
SYS. J. 3, 271 (2007).
70
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Blockchain technology, though still a new field, has the
potential to be as impactful upon people’s lives as the field of
law. 74 It is easy to find examples of blockchain technology being
used for corrupt purposes; during the first three months of 2019,
$356 million in cryptocurrency was stolen. 75 There will always be
fraud and theft in any sphere (one need not look too far to find
equally outrageous corruption in the legal field). High-profile
blockchain fraud and the resulting publicity is part of the reason
that lawmakers, academics, lawyers, and engineers are striving to
create a regulatory scheme that will match this revolutionary
technology. 76
Blockchain proponents might argue that, as a technology
governed by code, human decision-making is irrelevant to
blockchain. However, “[b]lockchains are systems designed,
implemented, and used by humans. Subjective intent remains
relevant even when expressed through objective code.” 77
Moreover, even if blockchain technology works perfectly, the
potential for “human fallibility and corruption” can remain a
fundamental issue. 78 As discussed above, decisions about future
code design in public blockchain platforms are influenced by a
small number of developers, and newly emerging blockchains such
as Libra further limit development to the elite few. How can we
ensure that these agents of influence remain ethical? One clear
answer is to start talking about ethics issues in blockchain,
74
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 182 (“[B]lockchain has the potential to
influence and even transform a long list of industries, concepts, and systems.”).
75
David Canellis, $356 Mmillion in Cryptocurrency Stolen in First Three
Months of 2019, NEXT WEB (May 1, 2019), https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/
2019/05/01/cryptocurrency-stolen-first-quarter-2019-hack/
[https://perma.cc/SB2A-TTHA].
76
See, e.g., Caitlin Long, Seismic News About State Virtual Currency Laws:
ULC Urges States To Withdraw Model Act, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/25/seismic-news-about-statevirtual-currency-laws-ulc-urges-states-to-withdraw-model-act/#524a0da25fda
[https://perma.cc/EPJ5-E6DQ]; Werbach, supra note 3, at 514 (“The limitations
of the blockchain create problems when it is positioned as the sole guarantor of
enforcement.”).
77
Werbach, supra note 3, at 494.
78
Sulkowski, supra note 42, at 306–07.
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particularly the issues raised by humans influencing coding
decisions in blockchain platforms. 79
Blockchain may indeed be so revolutionary that individuals
may well someday be able to “self-govern” and avoid legal rules. 80
But because blockchain is in its early stages, governments still
have the ability to “shape the development of the technology by
passing laws and regulations that will either constrain or promote
the technology’s growth and adoption.” 81 Given this power, state
legislators and the Uniform Law Commission, who are currently
considering blockchain legislation, 82 should recognize the need for
an ethical code of conduct in blockchain laws. Indeed, “regulators
who do nothing will be a greater threat to the development of the
market than those who engage in thoughtful and evolving efforts to
address public policy [including ethical] considerations.” 83
Including an ethical code of conduct in draft legislation would
indicate that regulatory authorities recognize the dangers inherent
in developing technology without considering ethical standards. 84
Blockchain proponents might object to ethical codes of conduct
as part of state regulation. Ironically, however, the need for ethical
guidance is so great that blockchain advocates and engineers have
begun to fill the void by proposing their own code of conduct. A

Experts are considering alternative approaches. For example, Professor
Angela Walch argues that blockchain developers who exercise power over
public blockchains could be considered fiduciaries who can be held accountable
through the fiduciary duty doctrine. Walch, supra note 13, at 73–75.
80
FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 56.
81
Id. at 57.
82
Long, supra note 76.
83
Werbach, supra note 3, at 533.
84
We have already seen this danger play out in the context of large social
media companies, for “if regulators had applied some pointed pressure only a
decade ago, when all the same warning signs were there, we could have
prevented the mess we find ourselves in now, with rampant disinformation,
egregious privacy breaches and in-plain-sight addictive elements built right into
the medium.” Kara Swisher, The People Screaming for Blood Have No Idea
TIMES
(June
4,
2019),
How
Tech
Actually
Works,
N.Y
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/opinion/facebook-google-regulation.html
[https://perma.cc/FQ8T-5TC9].
79
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group called Blockchain for Good is organizing blockchain leaders
to collaborate in creating a “Blockchain Code of Ethics.” 85
Similarly, engineers from the Ethereum Foundation proposed a
Code of Conduct on the Ethereum platform. 86 The Code is “meant
for a decentralized community[,]” meaning that teams and
initiatives could work collectively to create an ethical scheme. 87
The Beeck Center at Georgetown University also published a
framework for “blockchain ethical design.” 88 The framework
differs from a code of conduct, but it is intended to be used as a
“tool for creating intentional design that incorporates key ethical
questions” as blockchain projects are developed. 89
It is clear that the blockchain community already recognizes
the need for ethical codes of conduct. The existing proposals are
mainly focused on avoiding harassment and ensuring inclusivity of
minority populations in this space. These are admirable goals, and
engineers should be recognized for creating codes of conduct when
BLOCKCHAIN FOR GOOD, http://blockchaincodeofethics.com/blockchaincode-of-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/7FJM-QKHX] (last visited July 18, 2019).
Their mission statement declares “We the people, the creators, the developers,
the business leaders, the culture designers of our time, endeavor to create a
framework for Ethical Blockchain Companies, which will hold organizations
accountable . . . .” BLOCKCHAIN FOR GOOD, We the People,
http://blockchaincodeofethics.com/we-the-people/
[https://perma.cc/7WHXT2LD] (last visited July 18, 2019).
86
See Ethereum Community’s Code of Conduct v1, HACK MD,
https://hackmd.io/KAVQHbnRR8SMsY_YIin9qA
[https://perma.cc/M4B2GVDP] (last visited July 18, 2019).
87
Integrity Ring of the Ethereum Magicians, CODE OF CONDUCT PROJECT,
https://github.com/jpitts/integrity-ring [https://perma.cc/D46X-TMTN] (last
visited July 18, 2019).
88
Cara Lapointe & Lara Fishbane, The Blockchain Ethical Design
Framework, BEECK CENTER FOR SOCIAL IMPACT + INNOVATION,
http://beeckcenter.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TheBlockchain-Ethical-Design-Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FFE-8KLZ] (last
visited July 18, 2019).
89
Id. at 21. These broad questions include governance, identity,
verification/authenticity, access, ownership of data, and security. Id. at 22. This
framework is intended to help decision-makers creating or influencing social
impact solutions “that may involve the design and implementation of a
blockchain.” Id. at 21. It is more focused on entrepreneurs than regulators or
blockchain users.
85
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they were not required to do so. But this is an opt-in scheme,
meaning that each blockchain project can choose to adopt these
codes of conduct. Opt-in schemes are a good start, but companies
can also choose to avoid ethical standards completely.
States and the Uniform Law Commission should therefore
enter this domain with the creation of mandatory ethical standards
for blockchain technology companies, platforms, and projects.
Although this approach is undoubtedly controversial, it would
ensure that ethical standards are applied uniformly throughout this
field, regardless of whether such developers or platforms choose to
adopt such standards. Moreover, a legislatively developed set of
guidelines would enable the blockchain industry to implement
ethical rules without waiting for the development of judicially
created rules in various courts.
What would a mandatory code of conduct look like? States
could look to other professions for guidance. Accounting, medicine
and architecture all enforce codes of ethical conduct. 90 Legal ethics
standards, which have been vetted for over 100 years, provide a
useful framework. The legal field and the blockchain industry are
different, but they share unique characteristics. For example, both
fields require specialized knowledge as a barrier to entry, and both
fields possess a great deal of power to affect socioeconomic
change. In addition, lawmakers may feel comfortable drawing
from an ethical scheme that is already operating in their
jurisdictions.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION: BIAS AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
PROVISIONS IN A BLOCKCHAIN CODE OF CONDUCT
Given the fact that some public blockchain platforms, in
reality, rely upon centralized agents of influence for decisionSee, e.g., AM. INST. OF CPAS, “AICPA Code of Professional Conduct”
(2014), https://www.aicpa.org/ [https://perma.cc/4Q8P-5PAA]; AM. MED.
ASS’N, “Code of Medical Ethics,” https://www.ama-assn.org/deliveringcare/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview [https://perma.cc/4X5545HLresearch/
standards/codeofconduct.html] (last visited October 4, 2019); National Council
of Architecture Registration Boards, “Model Rules of Conduct” (July 2018),
https://www.ncarb.org/sites/default/files/Rules_of_Conduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9KZ-F8JK].
90
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making purposes, there are two areas of legal ethics that would be
valuable to blockchain technology: bias and conflicts of interest. 91
A. Bias
Human bias exists in different ways. Explicit bias is
“deliberately generated and consciously experienced as one’s own”
belief. 92 Explicit bias can be easy to identify based on a person’s
comments or actions. Implicit bias, on the other hand, may not be
recognized even by the person with the biased beliefs. 93 Every
person has some implicit bias, which is “an association or
preference that is not consciously generated and is experienced
without awareness.” 94 These biases impact our decisions,
especially snap decisions made quickly without much
forethought. 95
When biases affect the decision-making processes of
individuals in a position of power, such as judges, the
consequences can be harmful. 96 Recognizing this risk, ethics codes
for judges prohibit actions based on bias. Judges are prohibited
from manifesting bias, prejudice, or “harassment, including but not
limited to [actions] based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status,
socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.” 97 Violation of these
rules can result in disciplinary proceedings for lawyers and judges,
including extreme measures such as loss of one’s bar license 98 or
removal from the bench. 99
91
It is beyond the scope of this article to create a fully drafted code of conduct
for state adoption.
92
J. Bernice B. Donald & Sarah E. Redfield, Framing the Discussion, in
ENHANCING JUSTICE, REDUCING BIAS 5, 14 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017).
93
Michele Benedetto Neitz, Pulling Back the Curtain: Implicit Bias in the
Law School Dean Search Process, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 629, 656 (2019).
94
Donald & Redfield, supra note 92, at 14.
95
For a detailed discussion of implicit bias, see Neitz, supra note 93, at 656;
see also Donald & Redfield, supra 92.
96
See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61
CLEV. ST. L. REV 137 (2013).
97
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
98
See WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.220 (2019). For an example of a judge
removed from the bench for inappropriate conduct, see Wendy Davis, Bullying
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Bias is already making headlines in the field of technology,
including hiring bias in tech companies 100 and bias in the
development of AI and machine learning. 101 But the bias at issue
here relates to the potential biases of the aforementioned “agents of
influence” in public blockchains.
For example, knowing that each person holds implicit (and
potentially explicit) biases that influence decision-making, how
can we know what the biases of Ethereum core developers or the
Libra Association may be? If they hold implicit biases against a
certain group, these biases may result in members giving more
weight to one member’s suggestion than to another’s. For example,
the Libra Association’s exclusion of smaller, less successful startup entrepreneurs may suggest that the wealthy and powerful
members of the Libra Association hold socioeconomic biases. In
fact, by not even granting Founding Member status to non-elite
corporations and nonprofits, the Libra Association is starting out
with poor optics that could be interpreted as a display of bias.
Some may argue that the use of disguised identities online
helps to reduce biases, since it may be difficult to discern a
person’s gender or racial identity or socioeconomic status.
Pseudonymity is one of the key attributes of blockchain. 102
However, while this may be true for most aliases, many of these
agents of influence meet regularly online and in-person at
conferences. The use of aliases, in this sphere, does not guarantee
anonymity.
from the Bench: A Wave of High-profile Bad Behavior has Put Scrutiny on
Judges, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
bullying-from-the-bench [https://perma.cc/NQ9K-Z7WG].
99
See MODEL CODE FOR JUD. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 6(2)(1) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2011).
100
Gregory Mone, Bias in Technology, 60 COMM. OF THE ACM 19–20 (Jan.
2017),
https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2017/1/211099-bias-in-technology/
abstract [https://perma.cc/44UD-H8LC] (discussing the lack of diversity in the
tech work force).
101
Karen Hao, This is How AI Bias Really Happens—and Why It’s so Hard to
Fix, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
612876/this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/
[https://perma.cc/AK8J-7CW].
102
Lapointe & Fishbane, supra note 88, at 9.

64

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 41

The potential for bias therefore does exist on the blockchain, as
it does in all areas where humans make decisions. The problem is
not the presence of biases; the problem is the potential for biases to
influence “in a discriminatory way the contributions accepted in a
project.” 103 States should therefore consider including prohibition
of bias in an ethical code of conduct for blockchain technologies.
Like the rule for judges, this prohibition should include bias based
on “race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability,
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or
political affiliation.” 104
B. Conflict of Interest
The ABA Model Rules define a lawyer’s conflict of interest, in
part, as “a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.” 105 Judges are held to a higher standard, as
they are required to conduct their “personal and extrajudicial
activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations of
judicial office.” 106 The legal ethics scheme is most concerned with
the potential of a conflict of interest to benefit the lawyer at the
expense of the client.
How could there be potential conflicts of interest on public
blockchains? If the blockchain was completely decentralized, with
no agents of influence, one could argue that conflicts of interest are
irrelevant. After all, if no one person or node has too much power,
an individual’s conflict of interest would not have the potential of
harming other users.
However, given the heavy influence of only a few agents of
influence, conflicts of interest are much more likely to arise. At the
moment, there is no way for users of these platforms to know
whether the people influencing the code design underlying these
103
Jon Evans, On the War Between Hacker Culture and Codes of Conduct,
TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/05/how-we-maymesh/ [https://perma.cc/8XGT-QEX3].
104
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
105
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
106
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994).
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technologies truly have the best interests of the platform’s users at
heart. This is a particular problem for Facebook, given its
checkered history where it comes to protecting users’ data. 107
Some may challenge this idea by arguing that all users and
developers of cryptocurrencies have the same goal: elevating the
value of the currency. While this may be true, it is not hard to
imagine a scenario whereby some developers are heavily invested
in other currencies. These developers may have an interest in
seeing the devaluing of rival currencies. In addition, one could
argue that most users of these platforms recognize that purchasing
new currencies has some level of risk attached to it. Accordingly,
there is an ongoing debate over whether this area demands a
heightened standard such as a fiduciary duty. 108
But it does make sense to have, at a minimum, a prohibition on
conflicts of interest for the agents of influence who have such a
heavy dominance on the design of public blockchains. For
example, if a code bug or hack locks up hundreds of millions of
dollars of funds owned by the core developers, it would be very
hard for them to argue there is no conflict when choosing between
taking the route of a hard fork or not. 109 Core developers or Libra
Association members may also have investments in other projects
or personal conflicts affecting their coding decisions. Prohibiting
conflicts of interest—or at least requiring the disclosure of such
conflicts—could ensure that all agents of influence truly do have
the same goal.
Moreover, minimizing conflicts of interest in this area may
have the added value of reinforcing public trust in blockchain
currencies. While it is natural for members of the public to fear
new technologies, more people may be willing to invest in public
Herb Weisbaum, Trust in Facebook has Dropped by 66 Percent Since the
Cambridge Analytica Scandal, NBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/trust-facebook-has-dropped-51percent-cambridge-analytica-scandal-n867011[https://perma.cc/WU4Q-RE22].
108
See generally Walch, supra note 13 (arguing against the imposition of
fiduciary duties on public blockchain protocol developers); but see Raina S.
Haque, et al., Blockchain Development and Fiduciary Duty, 2 STANFORD J.
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 139 (2019).
109
See supra Section II.C. 1 and 2.
107
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blockchains if they knew states prohibited bias and conflicts of
interest in this industry.
V.

CHALLENGES TO CREATING A BLOCKCHAIN CODE OF
CONDUCT
Although the implementation of a code of ethics would bring
advantages to the blockchain industry, designing and implementing
a blockchain code of conduct does present challenges. This is
especially true given the originality of the blockchain industry.
A. The Power of the Miners
In a public blockchain cryptocurrency, miners of the currency
can just walk away if they do not like what is happening on a
particular blockchain. Indeed, miners can choose to mine any coin.
Thus, if it appears that bias or conflict of interest exists and will
impact the success of a public cryptocurrency blockchain, miners
will vote with their feet and move onto another coin. This type of
exodus would have a substantial impact on the currency of an
affected blockchain, causing it to lose value quickly.
In turn, some may argue that there is no need to have a code of
conduct, because miners can just leave if they sense an ethical
problem (especially one that might affect their profits). However,
as we have seen with the problems faced by large “Big Tech”
companies, a scheme relying on a market-based solution to ethical
issues will eventually fail. 110 Indeed, as “one ethical quandary after
another has hit [big tech companies’] profoundly ill-prepared
executives, their once-pristine reputations have fallen like palm
trees in a hurricane.” 111 Leaders of the nascent blockchain industry,
who are working to refute early public images of cryptocurrency as
a method for fraud, 112 can ill-afford the loss of the industry’s
reputation due to ethical scandals.
110
See Kara Swisher, Who Will Teach Silicon Valley to Be Ethical?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/opinion/who-willteach-silicon-valley-to-be-ethical.html [https://perma.cc/9WX5-VQ4N].
111
Id.
112
IG Analyst, The Silk Road to Bitcoin: Has the Crypto Escaped its Dark
Past?, IG (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.ig.com/au/trading-opportunities/the-silk-
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B. Backlash
There would likely be a strong reaction to a state’s
implementation of a code of conduct for blockchain platforms. In
fact, “[t]here are still developers who vehemently oppose the entire
idea of codes of conduct.” 113 Blockchain developers who embrace
the libertarian ideal will argue that implementation of a common
standard goes against the very freedoms that make blockchain a
revolutionary technology.
We can draw a parallel to the “Contributor Covenant Code of
Conduct” drafted in 2014 for open source projects. Computer
programmer Coraline Ada Ehmke recognized that “bad or
questionable behavior” was commonplace among open source
developers, and created an optional Code of Conduct for the open
source community. 114 The Code includes a list of Standards with
“[e]xamples of behavior that contributes to creating a positive
environment,” as well as “[e]xamples of unacceptable behavior by
participants.” 115 In anticipation of objections, the drafters of the
Code also included a list of Frequently Asked Questions. The
questions reveal what some members of the community may really
believe about ethical guidance (“Are codes of conduct a
mechanism for turning project governance over to ‘social justice
warriors’?”), and should therefore be reviewed by anyone involved
in drafting a code of conduct in this field. 116

road-to-bitcoin--has-the-crypto-escaped-its-dark-past--41990-180205
[https://perma.cc/8C48-THVR].
113
Klint Finley, The Woman Bringing Civility to Open Source Projects,
WIRED (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/woman-bringing-civilityto-open-source-projects/ [https://perma.cc/4DVA-Z4ND].
114
Id.
115
Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, CONTRIBUTOR COVENANT,
https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/1/4/code-of-conduct
[https://perma.cc/V2Z3-WAEW] (last visited July 18, 2019).
116
Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct FAQ, CONTRIBUTOR COVENANT,
https://www.contributor-covenant.org/faq [https://perma.cc/6YNJ-ND5U] (last
visited July 18, 2019). Other questions include “Won’t a code of conduct have a
negative effect on the end product?” and “Doesn’t this code of conduct just
promote political correctness?” Id.

68

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 41

Although the Contributor Covenant has been adopted by tens
of thousands of open source projects, 117 it is not without critics.
Those who oppose codes of conduct in general, and the
Contributor Covenant in particular, are concerned that such rules
would “be used to police their speech away from their open source
work.” 118 The creator of Linux, Linus Torvald, used more flavorful
language to resist codes of conduct, telling Wired Magazine that
“trying to come up with some ‘code of conduct’ that says that
people should be ‘respectful’ and ‘polite’ is just so much crap and
bullshit.” 119 Torvald has since apologized for these remarks, 120 but
opposition to the implementation of any sort of ethical standards is
still prevalent in the blockchain community. 121 If states can work
with industry leaders to draft regulations, as New York, California,
and other states are starting to do, 122 developers may be more
willing to create cultures that adhere to ethical standards.
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would adopt an open code of conduct authored by the TODO Group, but the
TODO Group has since ceased work on the code of conduct; see id.; see also
Followup: Open Code of Conduct, TODO GROUP (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://todogroup.org/blog/followup-open-code-of-conduct/
[https://perma.cc/4Z2A-BFRD].
122
See Aaron Wood, New York State Digital Currency Task Force Appoints
New Members, COINTELEGRAPH (July 24, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/
news/new-york-state-digital-currency-task-force-appoints-new-members
[https://perma.cc/YJE6-ZWQ6]; see also Blockchain Working Group, CAL.
GOV’T
OPERATIONS
AGENCY,
https://www.govops.ca.gov/blockchain/
[https://perma.cc/DP73-XFKG] (last visited Aug. 23, 2019); William Foxley,
New Jersey Signs Blockchain Task Force Program Into Law, COINDESK (Aug.
9, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/new-jersey-signs-blockchain-task-forceprogram-into-law [https://perma.cc/DX5Z-V9TT].

DEC. 2019]

The Influencers

69

C. Enforcement
If states or the Uniform Law Commission were to adopt ethical
standards for blockchain platforms and companies, the next logical
question is: how will they be enforced? For example, will
developers lose their place of influence if they act in a biased
manner or have conflicts of interest? How would the Libra
Association handle a founding member with a conflict of
interest? 123 In addition, there are jurisdictional challenges to
enforcement, as blockchains are global and one country or state’s
laws will not apply universally.
The topic of effective enforcement for ethical standards in this
new field is in need of further research. Countries and states that
are in a position to lead the way in the area of ethical regulation
may serve as pilots for other jurisdictions. At a minimum, the
problem of enforcement does reinforce the importance of
blockchain industry support of and commitment to a successful
code of conduct.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology, like its predecessors the railroad and
the Internet, will revolutionize the world. Although this new
industry is rooted in the concept of decentralization, blockchains
do rely upon certain agents of influence for decision-making
purposes. Recognizing this reality, this article is intended to spark
a debate regarding the need for ethical rules tailored to this new
technology. States drafting blockchain laws should engage in this
debate and consider incorporating particular ethical rules
borrowing from existing codes of conduct for lawyers.
Specifically, these rules should include the prevention of bias and
conflict of interest provisions. Since there can be no doubt that

Libra’s White Paper states that a Founding Member who does not comply
with “eligibility criteria” can be removed by a supermajority vote of the council,
but it is noteworthy that Facebook has not anticipated ethical issues arising
among its Founding Members. See LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 8.
123
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blockchain technology is here to stay, now is the time to ensure
this technology is developed in an ethical manner. 124

Werbach, supra note 3, at 512 (“These are still early days [for the
blockchain] . . . as big as the market has grown, there is far less at stake . . . than
there will be in three, or five, or ten years.”).
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